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Regulation of Payday Loans: Misguided?
Paige Marta Skiba*
Abstract
Since payday lenders came on the scene in 1990s, regulation of
their “predatory” practices has been swift and often severe. Fourteen
states now ban payday loans outright. From an economist’s
perspective, high-interest, short-term, small loans need not be a bad
thing. Payday credit can help borrowers “smooth” consumption,
unequivocally improving welfare as consumers borrow from future
good times to help cover current shortfalls. These benefits of credit
can accrue even at typical payday loan interest rates of 300%–600%
APR. The question of whether payday credit actually assists
borrowers in this way is an empirical one. In this Article, I review the
existing evidence on how borrowers use payday loans. I document the
prevalence of rollovers and default, the effect of varying principal
amounts and loan durations, the existence of self-control problems
and myopia among borrowers, and the demand for payday loans
over other types of cheaper credit. I then document the disconnect
between this collection of evidence and the existing regulatory
frameworks which purport to help consumers avoid misuse of
payday loans. These regulations on payday lending include outright
bans, price caps, minimum and maximum loan lengths, minimum
and maximum loan sizes, and rollover restrictions. I argue that:
(1) outright bans are misguided, (2) larger loans can actually help
borrowers, (3) loan-length restrictions are ineffective, and (4) rollover
restrictions do make sense.
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I. Introduction
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act,1 passed in July 2010, rang in a new era of financial regulation.
Its reforms will affect financial institutions from big banks to
pawnbrokers. Payday loans are no exception. We can expect many
changes to the regulatory landscape of these small-dollar, shortterm loans from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which
opened its doors in July 2011.2 Payday loans are about the most
expensive form of credit consumers can legally obtain. The
originating loan lasts just a matter of days and is used primarily by
low- and middle-income households. Given that ten million
households use payday loans every year,3 these regulatory changes
will have a significant impact on a large group of consumers.
1. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12
U.S.C.A. §§ 5301–5641 (2010) (codifying the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. Law No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)).
2. See id. §§ 5491–5497 (establishing and outlining the powers and duties
of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau); Learn About the Bureau, THE
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (2011), http://www.consumerfinance.
gov/the-bureau/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (explaining the history, mission, and
structure of the CFPB) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause
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Payday loans are almost universally deemed “predatory” and
“usurious” by consumer advocates, policymakers, and the media.
Alabama state senator Lowell Barron has stated, for example, that
“[t]he consumers being picked on here are the poorest, low-income
people . . . there is no reason why anyone should exploit people with
a short-term cash problem.”4 Others have described payday lending
as an “immoral practice” (State Senator Groff, Colorado),5 as a
“trap” (Michael A. Stegman, Director of Housing and Policy at the
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Illinois),6 as
“ruin[ing] lives” (State Representative McClure, Arizona),7 and as
imposing “astronomical interest rates” and “unrealistic payment
terms” (Senator Hagan, South Carolina).8
Adopting similar views, many state policymakers have worked
hard to curb or halt payday lenders’ operations. We can predict even
more regulation with the advent of Dodd–Frank and the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau. Recently appointed Bureau Director
Richard Cordray gave a lecture on payday loans in January 2012,
stating that regulators at the CFPB “recognize the need for
emergency credit. At the same time, it is important that these
Bankruptcy? 1 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 11-13,
2011) (explaining that, despite high interest rates, between three and ten
million American households borrow on payday loans each year) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. CASH IN A PINCH (Oct. 9, 2011), http://cashinapinch.com/index.php/
2011/10/09/senator-lowell-barron/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2012) (quoting Alabama
State Senator Barron) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. See Payday Lending Reform Looks Likely to Pass, COLORADO POLS, Mar.
26, 2008, http://www.coloradopols.com/diary/5709/ (“Going back to biblical times,
governments have tried to deal with this immoral practice.”).
6. See Michael A. Stegman, Payday Lending, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 169, 176
(2007) (referring to rollovers and serial borrowing through payday loans as “debt
trap[s]”).
7. See Proposed Ballot Measure Would Ban Payday Loans in Arizona,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 14, 2007, available at http://ktar.com/?nid=
6&sid=480759 (last visited Jan. 25, 2012) (quoting State Representative
McClure, who also compared regulation of payday lending to laws governing
drug use) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. See Bill Targets Payday Lending: Legislation Co-sponsored by Hagan
Would Tighten Regulation, CHARLOTTE POST, Apr. 22, 2010, available at
http://thecharlottepost.com/index.php?src=news&srctype=detail&category=New
s&refno=2577 (last visited Jan. 25, 2012) (quoting Hagan and discussing a new
bill to regulate payday lending) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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products actually help consumers, rather than harm them. . . .
[N]ow, the Bureau will be giving payday lenders much more
attention.”9 At the state level, regulation of payday loans has
already taken many forms. In this Article, I argue that current
forms of state and federal regulation of payday lending are largely
misguided. I summarize the growing body of microeconomic
evidence on borrowers’ use of payday loans and assess what their
predicted responses to a number of different regulatory schemes—
outright bans, price caps, and restrictions on loan size, duration, and
renewals—means about the soundness of those types of regulations.
I conclude that most current regulations that restrict access to
payday loans do not increase consumers’ welfare. Efforts to directly
curb loan rollovers10 are the one type of regulation that does make
policy sense, because extending loans for multiple pay periods leads
to welfare-damaging behavior in a way that other features of
payday loans targeted by lawmakers do not.
The mainstream view seems to be that payday loans are
abusive.11 From an economist’s perspective, credit in general allows
consumers to smooth consumption over time, meaning that they
borrow from future good times to help make it through current
tough times. This smoothing is seen as an uncontroversial, good
thing, and takes many forms, such as using student loans during
graduate school with the expectation that one will later be able to
repay the loans with one’s salary; microcredit (small dollar loans
initiated in developing countries to provide access to credit for
individuals who are turned away from banks);12 small business
9. Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Remarks at the
Payday Loan Field Hearing in Birmingham, Alabama (Jan. 19, 2012), available
at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speeches//remarks-by-richard-cordray-atthe-payday-loan-field-hearing-in-birmingham-al/.
10. Rollovers (sometimes called “renewals”) allow a borrower to make an
interest payment only on the due date of the originating loan in order to extend
the loan for an additional pay cycle. After this extension, the borrower can repay
in full, or rollover the loan yet again by making an additional interest payment.
11. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Address at Osawatomie, Kansas
(Dec. 6, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/07/us/politics/textobamas-speech-in-kansas.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Obama,
Kansas Address] (describing payday lenders as taking advantage of Americans)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. See, e.g., What is Microcredit?, GRAMEEN BANK (Oct. 2011), http://www.
grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=108
(last visited Jan. 25, 2012) (explaining the diverse array of lending practices
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owners using credit to invest in money-making capital such as
machinery; and consumers using credit to buy durable goods like
refrigerators and washing machines that they could not pay for in
full up front.
Such benefits of consumption smoothing are not lost at interest
rates that many consider usurious. Payday loans are no doubt
extremely expensive. Lenders typically charge $10–$20 per $100,
equivalent to a 260%–520% annualized percentage rate (APR) on a
two-week loan.13 APR is calculated by multiplying the interest rate
for the two-week loan (typically 10%–20% as mentioned above) and
multiplying it by twenty-six, the approximate number of two-week
periods in one year. Viewing this fee or interest rate in the form of
an APR allows for easy comparison to other types of credit, which
are typically much longer-term.
While triple-digit interest rates may sound outrageous,
borrowing against future paychecks at such a high APR can be
worth it if consumers’ marginal utility is raised sufficiently to
outweigh the expenditure they will make on interest. For example,
if a consumer’s car breaks down and she would be fired if she could
not get to work tomorrow, it may be rational for her to borrow at
extremely high interest rather than forgo all wage income for the
foreseeable future.
Accordingly, used in the framework for which they are
intended, payday loans can increase a borrower’s utility. But
lawmakers who look down on payday loans and see their short
durations and high interest as flaws appear not to have considered
the strong theoretical case for the benefits of credit and the fact that
many consumers have no other forms of credit available. Many
states have now banned payday lending based on the assumption
that it enables borrowing behavior that leads to costly cycles of debt,
and other states are not far behind.14 But there is little evidence
encompassed by the term “microcredit”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
13. See, e.g., Obama, Kansas Address, supra note 11.
14. See, e.g., Times Topics: Payday Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2010,
available at http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit/
payday_loans/index.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2012) (stating that twelve states
have banned payday lending) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); U.S. REP. GABRIELLE GIFFORDS ACTS TO BAN PAYDAY LENDING
NATIONWIDE, (Jun. 30, 2010), http://www.votesmart.org/public-statement/526382/usrep-gabrielle-giffords-acts-to-ban-payday-lending-nationwide (last visited Jan. 25,
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that payday loans per se are unequivocally bad for borrowers or that
consumers overall are better off without access to payday loans.
Payday loans are by no means always utility-enhancing of
course. People frequently use payday loans for purposes other than
avoiding emergency situations. Research on payday loans, much of
which is outlined below, makes clear that the typical payday
borrower returns to a lender many times, taking out multiple loans
and rolling them over multiple times.15 Further, one can show that
repeated use of payday loans is frequently inconsistent with the
standard rational-actor model traditionally used in economic
analysis.16
It is also important to consider the full portfolio of one’s finances
and the cascading effect of earlier expenditures on one’s current or
future financial situation. Payday loans are not used in isolation. A
consumer may show up to the payday lender ostensibly because of
an unusually large utility bill, but may have been unable to pay that
bill in the first place because she maxed out her credit card and
bought a car she could not afford.
When used in the appropriate circumstances and in
moderation, and when paid off promptly, payday loans have the
potential to increase individuals’ utility in a way that is difficult to
achieve using any other form of credit. This is especially true
because many forms of credit are seldom available to the population
that tends to use payday loans.17 However, payday loans do
2012) (stating that sixteen states have banned payday lending) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. See, e.g., Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loans,
Uncertainty, and Discounting: Explaining Patterns of Borrowing, Repayment,
and Default 6 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 03-33, 2008)
(explaining that almost half of all the payday loans in our sample were renewed,
“resulting in significant durations of indebtedness”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Susan Payne Carter, Paige Marta Skiba &
Justin Sydnor, The Difference a Day Makes: Measuring the Impact of Payday
Loan Length on Probability of Repayment (Feb. 2012) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
16. See Paige Marta Skiba, Rationality and Regulation of Payday Loans, in
HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (forthcoming) (discussing this
argument in greater detail). People do use payday loans to make seemingly
suboptimal expenditures like throwing parties. Behavioral economics often
identifies this type of behavior—engaging in nonessential spending to one’s own
(future) detriment—as a self-control problem. See id.
17. See Meghan Hoyer, Who Uses Payday Loans? Not Who You Might
Think, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 29, 2008, available at http://hamptonroads.com/
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sometimes seem to invite abuse, leading to a loop of borrowing with
repeated renewals involving skyrocketing interest payments. State
legislatures often seek to constrain the use of payday loans for this
reason,18 but better policy would permit payday lending at least to
the extent it increased utility, and would constrain it only as
necessary to prevent the truly negative net effects.
The question, then, is: What is the right regulation? My
analysis suggests that regulations focused on restricting
rollovers/renewals make sense because they do provide helpful
protection to consumers, while other types of regulations (beyond
basic information disclosures) generally overreach and inhibit
unique opportunities for consumers to increase utility. The current
analysis of, and policy conversations around, payday loans tend to
ignore the good and instead demonize payday loans. As I document
below, however, data show that there is a need for a more nuanced
examination of payday loans because, in some circumstances at
least, the good outweighs the bad. Any regulations that constrain
payday borrowing beyond restrictions on rollovers/renewals are
suspect because they remove or inhibit the use of a tool that lowincome people use to smooth their income stream.19 This is
something higher-income people rarely need because they typically
have more buffers—savings accounts, regular credit cards, etc.—
against unexpected shocks. One could argue that payday loans are
dangerous in the same way that credit cards are dangerous: Some
people max out their credit and pay only their minimum balances
for months, to their own detriment.20 But most people are still glad
2008/01/who-uses-payday-loans-not-who-you-might-think (last visited Apr. 9,
2012) (explaining that payday loans are used even by middle-class consumers
who are trying to make ends meet and quoting a payday lender who justified the
continued demand for payday loans, saying “[t]here’s nobody out there meeting
this need with a less expensive product”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
18. See, e.g., id. (describing payday lending as a major issue in the Virginia
General Assembly because some legislators feel it must be constrained to protect
the poor).
19. See, e.g., Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 3, at 1 (describing how credit is
used to smooth consumption and cope with short-term shocks).
20. See David Laibson, Andrea Repetto & Jeremy Tobacman, Estimating
Discount Functions with Consumption Choices over the Lifecycle 7 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13314, revised and resubmitted,
American Economic Review, Nov. 14, 2007), http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/
tobacman/papers/Estimating%20Discount%20Functions.pdf (describing credit
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the mainstream forms of credit exist. Unlike these traditional forms
of credit, payday regulation is a patchwork of rapidly evolving rules
that vary drastically by state.
Federal and state regulation of payday loans includes outright
bans, interest rate caps, limits on rollovers/renewals, information
disclosure rules, regulations specific to military personnel, ceilings
and floors on loan amounts, and restrictions on loan duration.
Meanwhile, some states have no payday-loan-specific regulation. I
explore the consequences (intended or otherwise) of these various
constraints on borrowing by analyzing existing empirical evidence
on consumers’ use of payday loans. I argue that many attempts at
constraining borrowing are misguided and decrease the overall
welfare of borrowers—and potentially also of third parties through
negative externalities. The question is not whether to regulate
payday loans, but how to design regulations that protect people from
the negative effects of payday loans while preserving the ability of
such loans to enhance borrowers’ utility by smoothing their income
stream. Certain aspects of the regulations are uncontroversial. We
want people to have clear, concise information about the loan terms,
APR, etc., and we want lenders to abide by the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, Truth in Lending Act, and other regulations. But
when it comes to substantive restrictions on the permissibility or
permissible forms of payday loans, we need to look very carefully at
the consequences.
The origins of payday lending are an important feature that has
affected their subsequent regulation. Payday loans are different
from other credit in that they have become popular very quickly and
very recently. Nonexistent before the 1990s, payday loans now play
an important and regular role in how many Americans manage
shortfalls in their finances.21 Given their rapid growth, payday
lending is hardly a “fringe” activity any longer, as the title of this
symposium suggests.22 The regulatory environment mentioned
above is evolving just as swiftly as the loans came onto the scene.
card debt patterns).
21. See, e.g., Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 15, at 1 (reporting that ten
million American households used payday loans in 2002).
22. Payday loans require a steady income and checking account, so they are
not used by the poorest of the poor, as many might assume. Payday borrowers
are typically low-income with the average borrower having an annual income of
$20,000. See Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 3, at 5 (describing attributes of
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Perhaps because of how quickly payday lending came onto the
credit scene, such legislation has been quick, knee-jerk, and often
misguided.
II. Evidence of Consumer Behavior
To understand what, if any, regulation is appropriate for the
payday lending market, policymakers need to know how consumers
use payday loans. Below I discuss the small but growing body of
empirical evidence on the use of payday loans.
A. The Importance of Rollovers and Defaults
Consumer behavior in the payday lending industry can be
characterized by two things: defaults and rollovers. One-time usage
and prompt payment are not at all typical. Using administrative
records from a large payday lender, Jeremy Tobacman and I
measure the default rates and rollover frequencies to estimate the
self-control problems that might help explain the behaviors of these
borrowers.23 The results are quite striking: Over half of payday
borrowers default on a payday loan within one year of their first
loan.24 Such defaults are not cheap: Defaulting borrowers have, on
average, already repaid or serviced five payday loans, making
interest payments equal to 90% of their original loan’s principal.25
We use standard models of decision-making over time in an attempt
to explain such costly delayed default. We find the behavior is most
common for borrowers who have self-control problems and who
mispredict their ability to repay in full and their likelihood of taking
out subsequent loans.26
payday borrowers). Susan Payne Carter documents the fact that 3.4% of
households use payday loans, and it is now well-documented that payday
lenders outnumber both Starbucks and McDonalds. By 2009, more than ten
million households used payday loans.
23. See Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 15, at 2–3 (identifying the dataset
used in their study and the study objectives).
24. See id. at 1 (summarizing the results of their findings).
25. See id. (describing the situation commonly faced by payday borrowers
who default).
26. See id. at 2–3 (outlining some of the decision paths that contribute to
the risk of defaulting on payday loans). That paper uses models of hyperbolic
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Facts such as these indicate that rollovers are the norm, not the
exception. Payday loans can help consumers if used sparingly and
for emergencies—they have never been meant for long-term credit.
Because of the excessive use of rollovers, nineteen states have
banned them.27 The number of loans that people take out and
rollover is evident in another study with Tobacman. We used the
dataset from our earlier study to show that payday loans cause
personal bankruptcy. An interesting result of the paper is just how
frequently people use payday loans.
Our analysis shows that within the first year of borrowing, the
average individual takes out 5.48 more payday loans than a similar
consumer who applied for, but was ineligible to borrow on payday
loans.28 This translates into $1,841 of payday loan debt over a oneyear horizon, and $2,023 over two years, significant at the 1%
level.29 Given these facts, curbing rollovers is a sensible tack for
payday loan regulation.
B. Loan Sizes
Will Dobbie and I documented the effects that different loan
sizes have on default rates.30 We found that larger loans cause lower
discounting to document these facts. See David Laibson et al., A Debt Puzzle
(Nov. 11, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://bpp.wharton.
upenn.edu/tobacman/papers/A%20Debt%20Puzzle.pdf (describing the hyberbolic
discount model and its implications) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J.
ECON. 443, 445–46 (1997) (explaining the principles of time discounting
generally). See generally Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time
Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 351 (2002) (exploring the
foundations of the theory of hyperbolic discounting). Hyperbolic discounting
suggests that consumers mispredict their time preferences in the future.
27. See Rollover Bans Don’t Stop Payday Trap: Payday Industry’s Support
of False Reform Has Preserved Its Predatory Business Model in State After State,
CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.responsible
lending.org/media-center/press-releases/archives/rollover-bans-don-t-stoppayday-trap.html (discussing how payday lenders circumvent bans on rollover
loans) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
28. See Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 3, at 16 (finding that the “approval
of first-time payday loan applications causes 5.48 more payday loan applications
within the next year,” and that this result is significant at the 1% level).
29. See id. (explaining the results in terms of annual debt accrued).
30. See Paige Marta Skiba & Will Dobbie, Information Asymmetries in
Consumer Credit Markets: Evidence From Payday Lending 2 (Vanderbilt
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default rates.31 This is surprising because it runs against the
traditional phenomenon of moral hazard, which has been
documented in many settings for decades.32 We used data from two
large payday lenders and exploited the facts that (1) firms offer
borrowers loans of no more than half of their net pay, and (2) loans
come in increments of $50.33 Together these facts mean that two
borrowers with nearly identical income (of, say, $599 and $600) get
different size payday loans ($250 and $300, respectively). This
allowed us to use a regression-discontinuity approach to estimate
the impact of loan amount on default rates.34 A $50 increase in loan
size leads to a 5.8–6.8 percentage point decrease in the probability of
default.35
These results suggest, somewhat counterintuitively, that larger
loan sizes may actually help borrowers make good on their loan,
rather than default. This effect must be weighed against our
additional evidence that severe adverse selection exists in this
market as well, i.e., those borrowers choosing larger loans for
unobservable reasons are more likely to default on their loans.
C. Loan Lengths
The very short terms of a payday loan contract (just a matter of
days or weeks) has been suggested to be detrimental to consumers.36
University Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 11-05, 2011) (discussing the
relationship between incremental increases in loan size and default rates) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
31. See id. (finding that “a $100 increase in loan size decreases the
probability that a borrower defaults by 2.8 to 3.8 percentage points”).
32. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Ausubel, Adverse Selection in the Credit Card
Market 1–2, 24–25, (University of Maryland, Working Paper, 1999)
(distinguishing “adverse selection” and “moral hazard” effects) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. See Skiba & Dobbie, supra note 30, at 1 (explaining the lending
practices of firms in their sample).
34. See id. at 2 (describing the application of the regression discontinuity
approach).
35. See id. at 12 (explaining the decrease in the probability of default).
36. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Consumer Alert: Payday Loans
Equal Very Costly Cash: Consumers Urged to Consider the Alternatives (Mar.
2008), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt060.shtm (last visited
Apr. 9, 2012) (warning consumers about the potential risks stemming from the
terms of a payday loan) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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States are now implementing extended repayment plans to give
consumers more time to repay.37
Susan Payne Carter, Justin Sydnor, and I studied the effect of
loan lengths on the probability of repayment, default, and renewal
using transaction data for a sample of payday borrowers between
2000 and 2004.38 To do so, we exploit the fact that states set
minimum lengths of time for which a borrower can take out a loan.
Most often that minimum is seven days. Therefore taking out a loan
six days before one’s next payday is not permitted; such a loan
would mature two pay dates from now. Thus, a biweekly-paid
borrower who arrives at the lender six days before their next pay
day will receive a six + fourteen = twenty-day loan contract.
Compare this to a borrower who arrives at the lender one day later,
i.e., seven days before their next payday. She will receive a sevenday loan. The difference between these two borrowers’ loan
maturation dates is thirteen days (equal to almost an entire pay
period). These effects stemming from state laws are illustrated in
Figure 1a, reproduced here.
We used these facts to measure the exogenous impact of taking
out a payday loan just one day later and thus having seven to
twenty days longer to repay the loan (depending on the borrowers’
payday frequency). We restricted our sample to states where
minimum loan lengths are seven days and borrowers are allowed to
rollover their loans. Our sample was also limited to borrowers who
were first-time applicants or who had not taken out a new payday
loan for ninety days since their last due date.
Across all specifications, we found either small or insignificant
effects of loan lengths on borrowers’ likeliness of repaying. Figure
37. See, e.g., The Va. Partnership to Encourage Responsible Lending, A
Borrower’s Guide to Changes in the New Payday Loan Law—Know Your Rights,
http://www.virginiafairloans.org/BorrowersGuide06_09.pdf (explaining Virginia’s
rules for payday loan repayment schedules relative to how frequently borrowers
are paid). Virginian lenders are now required to give a borrower two pay periods
in which to repay their loan. Borrowers paid weekly now have a minimum of
fourteen days to repay loans; borrowers paid biweekly have twenty-eight days;
borrowers paid semimonthly have thirty-one days; and borrowers paid monthly
have sixty-two days. See id.
38. See Susan Payne Carter, Paige Marta Skiba & Justin Sydnor, The
Difference a Day Makes: Measuring the Impact of Payday Loan Length on
Probability of Repayment (Feb. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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1b, reproduced here, shows the average loan length based on the
number of days before a borrower’s next pay date for borrowers who
are paid every other Friday.39 As the figure shows, over this
discontinuity there are very minimal effects of loan length on loan
outcomes.40
These results suggest that allowing borrowers to have an
additional pay period (in the case of borrowers paid every two
weeks, that means an additional fourteen days), may result in an
increase in the number of loans repaid and a decrease in the
number of loans renewed. The effect, however, is tiny: 1–2
percentage points. Our results do not support the belief that
lengthening the amount of time a borrower has to repay will have a
significant impact on repayment rates or rollover rates.
D. The Interaction of Payday Loans and Other Forms of Credit
Research has shown that payday borrowers are liquidity
constrained.41 Carter, for example, documented the interaction of
payday loan rollovers and pawnshop use. Using nation-level survey
data, she finds that in states where borrowers are allowed to
rollover loans at least six times that individuals are more likely to
use payday loans and pawnshops together relative to borrowers
living in states that prohibit rolling over loans.42 In a follow-up
39. We perform a similar analysis for borrowers who are paid every other
Thursday, those paid semi-monthly, and monthly. All results are consistent
across pay cycles.
40. We confirm that the observable characteristics of our borrowers
receiving different loan lengths, such as average credit score, loan amount,
and home ownership, do not vary significantly across this discontinuity.
41. See Edward Lawrence & Gregory Elliehausen, A Comparative
Analysis of Payday Loan Customers, 26 CONTEMPORARY ECON. POL. 299, 300
(2008) (explaining some of the options for liquidity-constrained consumers to
obtain credit); see also Skiba & Dobbie, supra note 30, at 16 (documenting that
payday borrowers would borrow fifty cents off an extra dollar of available
credit). This is significantly larger than what has been found in similar
previous studies of credit. See, e.g., David Gross & Nicholas Souleles, Do
Liquidity Constraints and Interest Rates Matter for Consumer Behavior?
Evidence From Credit Card Data, 117 Q.J. ECON. 149 (2002) (using credit card
data to analyze how consumers respond to changes in credit supply).
42. See Susan Payne Carter, Payday Loan and Pawnshop Usage: The
Impact of Allowing Payday Loan Rollovers (Jan. 15, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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paper, Carter and I explored the interaction of these two forms of
credit more directly.43 Using transaction-level data from a firm
that offers both payday loans and pawnshops, we find that
borrowers who take out pawnshop loans within one day of the
payday loan due date are more likely to rollover the loan rather
than repay in full.44 These results together provide evidence that
borrowers are using pawnshops to help meet payday loan interest
payments and extend their payday loans via rollovers.
Sumit Agarwal, Jeremy Tobacman, and I found that
consumers use payday loans even when they have much cheaper
credit card liquidity available, and make significant pecuniary
mistakes in doing so.45 Using a matched dataset of payday
borrowers with credit cards, we first examine how effectively
consumers choose between payday loans and credit cards.46 One
measure suggests a common mistake: Two-thirds of the matched
sample had at least $1,000 of credit card liquidity on the day they
take their first payday loans—much more than the average $300
payday loan.47 For a fourteen-day payday loan with a finance
charge of 18%, using credit card liquidity first would save these
households $300.48 We also find, using credit scores, that
liquidity is strongly increasing: Married credit card account
holders had almost twice the liquidity of singles, and credit card
liquidity was much higher for the elderly.49 Across these
distributions, most people in the matched sample appear to have
43. See Susan Payne Carter & Paige Marta Skiba, Borrowing from Peter to
Pay Paul? Pawnshops and Payday Loan Debt Cycles 1 (Extended Abstract,
2012) (explaining the goals of the paper) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
44. See id. at 3 (reporting some of the conclusions of their research).
45. See Sumit Agarwal, Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday
Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and Credit Scoring Puzzles?, 99 AM.
ECON. REV. 412, 412 (2009) (finding that most payday borrowers who also had a
major credit card had liquidity available through that credit card on the day
that they obtained a payday loan, and that the interest rates on such credit
cards were much lower than those on payday loans).
46. See id. (outlining their process and arguments).
47. See id. at 413 (summarizing a result revealed by their matched dataset).
48. See id. (comparing the potential savings of using normal credit cards to
the potential savings using payday lending for consumers who obtained a
payday loan even though they had available liquidity on a major credit card).
49. See id. (reporting relative credit card liquidity for various groups in the
dataset).
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credit card liquidity exceeding the size of the typical payday
loan—a fact quite surprising given the previous suggestion that
payday borrowers are credit constrained.50
While the fact that payday borrowers do not use their credit
cards may be surprising at first, this behavior might make sense. It
is reasonable to speculate that some borrowers consciously selfimpose the high interest rate of a payday loan instead of a credit
card in an effort to commit themselves to pay off the debt very
quickly.51
Use of payday loans over credit cards can also be explained
when one looks at the timing underlying credit card users’ choice to
use payday loans and their circumstances leading up to that
decision. Their available liquidity dramatically declines leading up
to the time they borrow on payday loans, suggesting they are in fact
rationally using other liquidity before they turn to payday loans.52
Table 1 in the appendix presents information about the path that
credit card liquidity takes during the year leading up to a customer’s
first payday loan. Several features of the data are apparent in Table
1. First, credit card liquidity drops by an average of $545 over the
previous year, an amount that is much larger than the average $300
size of a first-time payday borrower’s loan.53 Second, most of the
deterioration in liquidity happens in the five months before the
payday loan is taken.54 These results offer some insight into how
households end up borrowing on payday loans.
Carter, Tobacman, and I also documented interactions of
payday loans and other liquidity sources.55 We examined patterns of
50. See id. at 413–14 (relating the findings of available credit card liquidity
compared to the average payday loan).
51. See for example the work of Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin on
sophisticated hyperbolic discounters, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV.
103, 103–24 (1999).
52. See Agarwal, Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 45, at 412 (finding that
payday loan borrowers have experienced “substantial declines in credit card
liquidity in the year leading up to the payday loan”).
53. See id. (calculating the decrease in mean liquidity over the course of the
year, by subtracting the mean liquidity at time t from the mean liquidity at time
t-12, for a decrease of $1,556–$1,011=$545); see also infra Table 1.
54. See Agarwal, Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 45, at 415.
55. Susan Payne Carter, Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman,
Pecuniary Mistakes? Payday Borrowing by Credit Union Members, in FINANCIAL
LITERACY: IMPLICATIONS FOR RETIREMENT SECURITY AND THE FINANCIAL
MARKETPLACE 145 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Annamaria Lusardi, eds., 2011).
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financial choices by the members of a large credit union using
transaction-level administrative data on checking, savings, and lineof-credit accounts. Credit union members who took out payday loans
had substantially lower levels of liquidity available relative to
members who did not take out payday loans. Although levels of
liquidity were low overall, we still observed substantial payday loan
use when cheaper sources of liquidity were available, resulting in
average interest losses of about $88 over six-and-a-half months.
Together, this series of papers shows consumers often prefer
payday loans when they have cheaper credit available. Thus, they
may be deciding between credit options based on factors beyond the
interest-rate margin.
E. Evidence on Consequences of Using Payday Loans
The bigger-picture question that is important for policymakers
is the overall welfare effects of payday lending. But although a
substantial literature has explored whether payday loans help or
hurt consumer welfare, consensus on this question remains elusive.
Donald Morgan and Michael Strain used data on the number of
checks bounced from federal credit processing centers, complaints to
the FTC about lenders and debt collectors, and state consumer
bankruptcy filings from 1997 to 2007 to study how these variables
changed in Georgia and North Carolina after payday loans were
prohibited in 2004 and 2005, respectively.56 The authors found that
check bouncing, FTC complaints, and Chapter 7 bankruptcies all
increased significantly in Georgia.57 They also used data from
Hawaii, and found similar results.58 Morgan and Strain concluded
that limiting payday loan access results in a negative impact on
consumer welfare.
Jonathan Zinman applied an event study approach to compare
payday borrowers’ use of credit and financial situation in
56. See Donald P. Morgan & Michael R. Strain, Payday Holiday: How
Households Fare After Payday Credit Bans 1, 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff
Reports No. 309, Nov. 2007) (explaining the imposition of a ban on payday
lending in North Carolina and Georgia and the methods used in their study).
57. See id. at 3 (reporting the findings of their study).
58. See id. at 4 (explaining how an increase in the maximum permissible
amount of a payday loan resulted in a decline of debt problems among
Hawaiians).
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Washington (where there was no change in payday lending rules)
and Oregon from before a change to after a change.59 He found that
payday borrowers in Oregon substituted to bouncing checks and
paying bills late after the law changed, and that these individuals
had a significantly greater likelihood of experiencing an adverse
event such as job loss.60
Adair Morse studied the effects that financial distress has on
foreclosures and crime in areas with access to payday loans relative
to areas without access.61 Using data on natural disasters,
foreclosures, and crime in California, she found that areas
experiencing the random shock of a natural disaster have an
increase in foreclosures and some crimes, but that the presence of a
payday lender in the zip code reduces these effects.62 She concluded
that these results demonstrate that payday loans help alleviate
problems for people in financial distress caused by a natural
disaster.63
Brian Melzer measured access to payday loans using the
distance from a county in a state where payday loans are prohibited
to the closest state where payday loans are available.64 He used
household data from the Urban Institute, which asks questions
about financial hardship (difficulty paying bills, cutting meals,
moving out because of financial problems, and not using a phone for
a month) along with questions about health (postponing medical or
dental care, and drug purchases).65 Melzer found that access to
59. See Jonathan Zinman, Restricting Consumer Credit Access: Household
Survey Evidence on Effects Around the Oregon Rate Cap 2–3 (Fed. Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 08-32, 2008) (explaining the context of the
study and the type of analysis made possible by the change in the law) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
60. See id. at 3–4 (summarizing the findings of changes in consumers’
behavior and outcomes after the law changed).
61. See Adair Morse, Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villains?, 102 J. FIN. ECON.
28, 29 (2011) (describing the methodology used in her study of the effect of
payday lending in mitigating financial shocks caused by natural disasters in
California).
62. See id. at 42 (discussing findings which relate the presence of payday
lenders to decreased foreclosure and decreased larceny in the wake of disasters).
63. See id. at 43–44.
64. See Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence From the
Payday Lending Market, 126 Q.J. ECON. 517, 518–19 (2011) (describing the
design and theoretical basis of his study).
65. See id. at 524–26 (describing the dataset used in this study).
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loans had a positive impact on financial hardship, especially with
regard to difficulty paying bills.66
Scott Carrell and Jonathan Zinman looked at the impact of the
presence of payday loans on Air Force personnel’s performance.67
Using the assignment of airmen to bases by occupational needs and
not choice, along with variation in laws on the prohibition of payday
loans between states and over time, they found the presence of
payday loans in states where an airman is assigned increases the
likelihood of negative outcomes (Reenlistment Ineligibility or the
existence of an Unfavorable Information file), especially for the
young and financially unsophisticated (proxied for by job
assignment).68
Dennis Campbell, F. Asís Martínez Jerez, and Peter Tufano
used county-level data to show that access to payday loans is
associated with an increase in bank account closures.69 Lars Lefgren
and Frank McIntyre argued that bankruptcy rates are not
influenced by the legalization of payday lending.70
Tobacman and I found that payday loan applicants barely
approved for their first loans file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy
significantly more often than barely rejected first-time applicants.71
The magnitude of the effect is very large, representing an increase
of about two percentage points in bankruptcy filing rates, a near
doubling from the average.72 These results are consistent with the
66. See id. at 519 (summarizing findings of the study).
67. See Scott Carrell & Jonathan Zinman, In Harm’s Way? Payday Loan
Access and Military Personnel Performance 2 (Aug. 2008) (unpublished
manuscript) (explaining their methodology and research question) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
68. See id. at 2–3 (defining the metrics used in the study and reporting
their findings of the adverse impacts of payday borrowing on Air Force
personnel).
69. See Dennis Campbell et al., Bouncing out of the Banking System: An
Empirical Analysis of Involuntary Bank Account Closures 6 (Dec. 3, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript) (reporting that “the presence of payday lending is
positively related to [involuntary bank account] closures”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
70. See generally Lars Lefgren & Frank McIntyre, Explaining the Puzzle of
Cross-State Differences in Bankruptcy Rates, 52 J.L. & ECON. 367 (2008).
71. See Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 3, at 21 (summarizing the
conclusions of the study).
72. See id. (describing findings on the impact of payday borrowing on
bankruptcy filing rates).
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interpretation that payday loan applicants are financially stressed;
first-time loan approval precedes significant additional high
interest-rate borrowing, and the consequent interest burden tips
households into bankruptcy.73
In sum, there is no consensus on whether payday lending hurts
or helps consumers.
III. Current Regulations and Recommendations
Part II documented a large body of economic research on how
consumers use payday loans. From the various research paradigms
outlined above, a number of consistent facts emerge. First, evidence
is mixed as to whether payday loans aid in consumption smoothing
in practice.74 In any case, there is no evidence that payday loans are
welfare reducing on net.75 Part II.E documents that there are as
many papers showing that payday loans help consumers as those
that show they hurt consumers.76 From this mixed evidence, the
overwhelming view that payday loans are “toxic” or “predatory” is
somewhat surprising.77 One need not struggle, however, to find
examples of consumers who have suffered damaging consequences
of payday loans.78 But while there certainly exists evidence that
payday loans are harmful to some consumers in some situations,
73. See id. at 21–22 (synthesizing the results of the study and explaining
the interaction between payday loans and bankruptcy filings).
74. See, e.g., supra note 3 and accompanying text (explaining the
consumption smoothing hypothesis and studies illustrating its application in
observed behavior).
75. See supra notes 54–67 and accompanying text (surveying recent studies
and noting their different assessments of the impact of payday loans on
borrowers’ welfare).
76. See supra notes 54–67 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Liz Pulliam Weston, 6 Steps to Dumping Toxic Debt, MSN
MONEY (Jun. 16, 2009), available at http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/
SavingandDebt/ManageDebt/6-steps-to-dumping-toxic-debt.aspx (last visited
Feb. 5, 2012) (referring to payday and car title loans as examples of “extremely
toxic debt”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
78. See, e.g., Ellen Scultz & Theo Francis, High Interest Lenders Tap
Elderly, Disabled, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB120277630957260703.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (describing the
challenges faced by payday borrowers whose income is limited to government
benefits such as Social Security) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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there is as much evidence that payday loans help consumers
(although such evidence is not as well-publicized). Overall, then, the
evidence does not support outright bans.
Other notable facts also emerge from the empirical evidence.
Contrary to what payday lenders often suggest, rollovers are the
rule, not the exception.79 Default is very common.80 Longer loan
repayment periods do not seem to help borrowers repay their loans
in full.81 Self-control problems and myopia are prevalent, manifested
as mispredictions of subsequent borrowing behavior and ability to
repay.82 Finally, there are important interactions between payday
lending and other forms of credit: Borrowers use payday loans even
when other significantly cheaper forms of credit are available.83
People also choose to use payday loans when they have liquidity
available in their checking account.84 Together these facts can help
us determine what an optimal regulatory scheme would look like.
Below I lay out the current ways in which states regulate
payday loans and my assessment of the respective types of
regulations, based on the empirical evidence outlined above. Table 2
describes the current regulations by state.85

79. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text (reporting findings about
the widespread use of rollover payday loans and regulatory backlash against
them).
80. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (finding that over half of
payday borrowers default on a payday loan within one year of their first such
loan).
81. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text (finding no change in
default rates when loan repayment terms are extended).
82. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text (describing how poor
self-control contributes to negative outcomes of payday lending).
83. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (summarizing results of a
study showing that consumers will obtain a payday loan even when they have
access to more traditional, cheaper forms of credit).
84. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (explaining that two-thirds of
consumers in the survey had, on the day they obtained a payday loan, more
available credit through credit card liquidity than the average amount of a
payday loan).
85. See infra Table 2 (summarizing payday laws by state using data found
at http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/state-information).
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A. Bans
Fourteen states now completely ban payday loans.86 However,
as discussed in Part II, there is no evidence suggesting that payday
loans are on net bad for consumers. Thus, banning payday loans is
not appropriate. Better policy would help consumers avoid using
payday loans as a long-term credit instrument while maintaining
their availability in situations in which they will enhance utility. As
my analysis above shows, that likely means limiting rollovers, not
banning payday loans altogether.87
B. Interest Rate Caps
The typical interest rate caps implemented by policymakers
are, in practice, no different than outright bans. This is because
lenders are unwilling to lend below a few hundred percent APR.88
Payday lenders charge the state-prescribed maximum amount of
interest and are unwilling to charge (and apparently unable to make
profits) at lower prices.89 Prices lower than the typical triple-digit
interest rates will essentially eliminate payday lending. Accordingly,
my argument about price caps is identical to that regarding bans.90
C. Information Disclosures
Payday-loan contracts are simple. Unlike checking accounts,
subprime mortgages, and credit cards, contract terms are not
86. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting the number of states
that have banned payday lending); see also infra Table 2.
87. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text (detailing the prevalence
of rollovers in payday loans and the negative outcomes associated with this use
of payday loans).
88. See John Campbell et al., Consumer Financial Protection, 25 J. ECON.
PERSP. 91, 103 (2011) (proposing that that “a thirty-six percent interest rate
ceiling might not create ‘affordable’ payday loans but might simply lead to the
exit of existing vendors”).
89. See id. at 103 (“More generally, rate caps could lead to new products or
practices that skirt the rules or lead consumers to seek other, possibly even lessattractive, sources of short-term credit.”).
90. An interesting aside is what other elements lenders could or should
compete on. Lenders do not appear to compete on price. No risk-based pricing is
used. Some lenders advertise that they do not use any credit scoring process.
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hidden. Even though there is evidence that payday borrowers (like
most consumers) have trouble understanding interest,91 my
summary of the empirical literature on payday borrowing above
shows that borrowers’ behavior is not caused by information
problems but rather is due to mispredictions about their own
behavior. Accordingly, additional information (beyond the basics of
the Truth in Lending Act) would not be especially helpful to
consumers. All the information in the world would not get a
borrower past her self-control problems.92
D. Loan Lengths
The latest innovation in state regulation of payday loans is to
force lenders to give borrowers additional time to repay a loan. As
discussed above, longer loans do not appear to improve borrowers’
ability to repay, likely because of myopia.93 As such, loan length is
not a useful target of regulation. This is unfortunately because
extending loan terms would be a relatively cost effective, easy-toimplement, non-paternalistic policy instrument had it worked.
It should be noted that while longer loan durations may in fact
affect neither repayment nor rollover behavior, longer loans do
imply lower implied annualized interest payments (assuming
interest is not raised proportionately to the increase in loan terms).
To the extent that this implied price decrease per se is an important
goal of regulation, longer loan lengths will be effective. However, to
curb rollovers, a much more direct approach is necessary.
IV. Discussion
Payday loans are not all bad. While, as shown by research cited
above, some borrowers choose to use payday loans even when they
have cheaper credit available, other borrowers have no other choice
91. See, e.g., id. at 91–94 (surveying the array of financial instruments
available to consumers and consumers’ difficulty in understanding such
devices).
92. See Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 15, at 3–4 (describing the effect of
self-control on payday borrowing and repayment).
93. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text (explaining the
consequences of longer repayment terms on payday loans).
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because they are credit constrained. For the latter group of
borrowers, payday credit is a crucial tool that enables them to
borrow from tomorrow’s paycheck to meet today’s needs when doing
so will help prevent an even bigger loss—the exact situation that
payday loans are meant to address. Payday loans’ key virtue is that
they help credit constrained borrowers avoid financial consequences
like overdraft fees or utility shutoffs, which can be more costly than
payday loan interest payments. Optimal policy will help all
borrowers use payday loans responsibly. As discussed above, the
best way to do this is to restrict rollovers94 which several states
already attempt to do, though it is difficult to monitor borrowers
using multiple lenders at a time in practice. Some states are
implementing a centralized database to better track borrowers
across lenders. There is also a need for maintaining information
disclosures to ensure borrowers are aware of loan fees, such as those
regulated by TILA.95 Beyond that, however, information disclosures
are not a useful mechanism to help borrowers in general.
Let’s be clear: Borrowers almost surely do not literally optimize
decisions in the manner that the standard rational-actor framework
assumes. Milton Friedman compared an individual consumer’s
behavior to that of a pool player who does not know physics or
geometry, but whose play appears to have been dictated by very
sophisticated calculations, as if he or she were solving a complicated
math problem.96 The same as if argument may hold for borrowers.
They do not necessarily understand how to calculate APRs or their
own marginal utility (few of us do), but they proceed as if they do.97
Their behavior sometimes closely approximates the hypothetical
behavior of a perfectly rational actor, but sometimes misses the
mark pretty widely.

94. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text (explaining the negative
consequences of rollover use among payday borrowers).
95. See Truth In Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 121, 82 Stat. 146, 152
(1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (2006)) (explaining TILA’s general disclosure
requirements).
96. MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN
POSITIVE ECONOMICS 21 (1953) (presenting the pool player example).
97. See, e.g., Campbell et al., supra note 88, at 92–95 (explaining the limits
of consumers’ understanding and efforts to counter those limits with consumer
protection laws).
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Payday loans illuminate consumers’ general propensity for
irrational behavior quite well, because—unlike credit cards,
mortgages, and even checking accounts, which typically come with a
number of hidden fees—payday loan contracts are transparent and
clear. One might think consumers would evaluate the loans’ fairly
simple terms and then go on to use payday loans in the manner that
would maximize utility (it is fairly obvious that this would be to use
them only when doing so could prevent an even larger cost, and then
to pay them off the moment it becomes possible to do so). But while
payday loan terms are clear, borrowers’ future behavior is murky
and uncertain. Few borrowers predict that they will rollover payday
loans multiple times; like most people, they generally imagine their
future selves to be rational, patient, and time consistent, and to be
able to save rather than spend.98 As the research demonstrates,
however, things frequently do not play out that way.
No evidence suggests payday loans are unequivocally bad;
rather, borrowers sometimes use them in suboptimal ways (as most
of us do with financial products at one point or another). Rather
than attempting to shut down or severely restrict payday lending,
policymakers should acknowledge and examine the discrepancy
between the rational-actor ideal and borrowers’ behavior in the real
world, and craft rules that will enable payday loans to help
borrowers in the intended manner despite borrowers’ frequently
imperfect decision-making. It is clear that payday loans have great
potential to carry borrowers through short-term financial shocks,
providing quick, accessible credit that may not be available
elsewhere. It would be a shame to lose this function.

98. See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 51, at 104 (exploring “the
behavioral and welfare implications of present-biased preferences”).
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Table 1: Credit Card Liquidity
Liquidity Percentiles
Lag Time Before
the PDL
t-12
t-11
t-10
t-9
t-8
t-7
t-6
t-5
t-4
t-3
t-2
t-1
t

90th
2557
2581
2531
2587
2451
2460
2509
2319
2348
2280
2171
2177
2102

75th
2018
2086
2091
1841
1739
1643
1585
1585
1375
1395
1390
1359
1244

25th
1069
1070
1118
1023
867
867
804
793
711
663
664
623
583

Liquidity
10th
478
440
395
382
357
346
334
311
282
287
265
262
263

Mean
1556
1572
1587
1413
1595
1421
1380
1396
1284
1249
1122
990
1011

Std. Dev.
1036
1171
991
1205
1104
1148
1118
899
842
818
722
677
653

Table 2: Payday Laws99
Payday Loans
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado

Payday Loans
Legal?
Legal
Legal
Prohibited
Prohibited
Legal
Legal

Connecticut
DC
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana

Prohibited
Prohibited
Legal
Legal
Prohibited
Legal*
Legal
Legal
Legal

Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana

Legal
Legal
Legal*
Legal

Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan

Prohibited
Prohibited
Prohibited
Legal

Minnesota

Legal

Mississippi

Legal*

Rates
17.50%; 3%/month after default
$5 + the lesser of $15 per $100 or 15%

15% of check
20%: $0-$300 + 7.5%: #301-$500 plus 45% per annum
interest plus monthly maintenance fee $7.50 per $100
borrowed, up to $30 after first month.

Not Specified
10% + verification fee
15% of check
Not Specified
$15.50 per $100
15%: $0-$250: 13%: $251-$400:
10%: $401-$500
$15: $0-$100: $10 per $100 thereafter
15%
$15 per $100 + $1 database fee
$5 documentation fee + the greater of 16.75% of check
or $45 (After default: months 1-12: 36% per year:
months 13 and beyond: 18% per year)

15% of first $100: 14$ of second 100: 13% of third
$100: 12% of fourth $100: 11% of fifth $100: 11% of
sixth $100 + any database verification fee
$5.50: $0-$50: 10% +$5: $51-$100: 7% (min. $10) + $5:
$101-$250: 6% (min. $17..50) + $5: $251-$350 (After
default: 2.75% per month)
18% of check

#Renewals
Allowed
1
2
0
0
0
Not Specified

0
0
4
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
Not Specified
0
0

0
0
0
0

0

0

99. Table 2 shows the payday loan and pawnshop laws by state as of 2012.
Courtesy of Susan Payne Carter.
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Payday Loans
State
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska

Payday Loans
Legal?
Legal
Legal
Legal

Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York

Legal
Legal
Prohibited
Legal
Prohibited

North Carolina

Prohibited

North Dakota

Legal

Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia

Legal
Legal
Legal
Prohibited
Legal*
Legal
Legal
Legal
Legal
Legal*
Prohibited
Legal

Washington

Legal

West Virginia
Prohibited
Wisconsin
Legal
Wyoming
Legal
*Legal for check cashers only.

Rates
75%
25%
$15 per $100 or pro rata for any part thereof on
amount of check
Not Specified
36% annual interest
$15.50 per $100: $.50 verification fee per $100

#Renewals
Allowed
6
0
0
Not Specified
0
0
0
0
0

20% + databasing fee
28% annual interest
$15 per $100: $0-$300: $10 per $100: $301-$500
36% APR interest, $10 per $100 fee up to $30
10%
15% of principal
Not Specified
the lesser of 15% of the check or $30
$10 per loan + 48% annual interest
No usury limit
36% annual interest + $5 verification fee + 20% of
loan
15%: first $500: 10% remaining portion of the loan in
excess of $500 up to the $700 maximum
NO LIMIT
the greater of 20% or $30

1
0
0
2
0
1
0
4
0
0
Not Specified
0
0
0
0
1
0

